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ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment when Western 
Building Maintenance, Inc., under a comprehensive and exclusive contract with 
a property owner to maintain its properties, assumed the duty of the property 
owner to safely maintain its parking lot areas for invitees? 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the entry of summary judgment in a civil suit brought by 
Appellants Tracy and Jeffrey Gagnon (hereafter Gagnons) for personal injuries suffered when 
Tracy Gagnon (hereafter Gagnon) slipped and fell on 'black ice' in the designated parking lot 
area of her employer, Wells Fargo Bank (hereafter Wells Fargo). Gagnon suffered a significant 
closed head injury as a result of her slip and fall. At the time of Gagnon's accident the 
Respondent Western Building Maintenance, Inc., (hereafter Western), under a comprehensive 
and exclusive maintenance contract, had assumed Wells Fargo's property owner's duty to safely 
maintain all of its 76 statewide and Spokane, Washington, business properties. The Gagnons 
filed suit against Western seeking damages for Tracy Gagnon's severe and debilitating injuries 
and Jeffrey Gagnon's loss of consortium. R. pp. 1-3. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Gagnons filed suit in the First Judicial District, Kootenai County, Idaho, on 
December 4,2009. R. pp. 1-3. Western filed its answer on July 7, 2011. R. pp. 34-36. Western 
took the deposition of Gagnon and filed a motion for summary judgment with affidavits from a 
representative of Western and its attorney. R. pp. 46-47. Gagnon responded to the motion with 
an affidavit from a representative of Wells Fargo. R. pp. 117-146. The hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment was held on January 24, 2012. The district court filed its memorandum 
decision and order, and Judgment, on February 17, 2012. R. pp. 217-222. Gagnon timely filed 
her appeal to this Court on March 16,2012. R. pp. 227-228. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 1, 2004, Wells Fargo Bank entered into a comprehensive and exclusive 
property maintenance agreement with Western, covering all of the banks seventy-six business 
property locations in Idaho and Spokane, Washington. Western commenced maintenance of 
Wells Fargo's bank properties on December 1, 2004. R. pp. 119-146. The maintenance 
agreement was in force in December, 2007. R. pp. 117-118. It was a comprehensive and 
exclusive property maintenance agreement. R. pp. 117-149. As part of the contract, Western and 
Wells Fargo agreed that Western would maintain insurance to protect Western from liability to 
third parties and that this insurance was primary to and noncontributory with any insurance 
obtained by Wells Fargo. R. p. 121, ~~ 7 C and E. 
On the morning of December 5, 2007, Tracy Gagnon, a Wells Fargo employee, arrived 
for work at the bank's property in Hayden, Idaho. It was a bright and sunshiny morning when 
she arrived at the Wells Fargo offices. All of that changed in a heartbeat. When she parked her 
car in Wells Fargo's designated parking area it did not appear to be icy. R. p. 69. She was aware 
that the Western maintained the parking lot in the winter. R. p. 71. When she exited her car she 
slipped on 'black ice' and struck her head. She suffered life changing and debilitating injuries. 
R. p. 230. Jeffrey Gagnon suffered the loss of consortium as a result of Tracy's injuries. R. p. 
230. When the emergency personnel arrived on the scene they had to put down sand before they 
could get to her because the parking lot was extremely slippery. R. p. 70, page 19,1. 18-23. She 
was placed in an ambulance and taken for treatment. R. p. 70, p. 20, 1. 9-10. Gagnon filed a 
worker's compensation claim as a result of her accident and injuries. R. p. 71, at p.23, 1. 21-25; p. 
72, atp. 51,1. 1-4. 
2 
ISSUE 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment when Western Building 
Maintenance, Inc., under a comprehensive and exclusive contract with a 
property owner to maintain its properties, assumed the duty of the property 
owner to safely maintain its parking lot areas for invitees? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the Court applies the same standard of 
review as was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Summary 
judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. LR.C.P. 56 (c). If there is no genuine issue of material 
fact, only a question of law remains, over which the Court exercises free review. It is axiomatic 
that upon a motion for summary judgment the non-moving party may not rely upon its pleadings, 
but must come forward with evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise which contradicts the 
evidence submitted by the moving party, and which establishes the existence of a material issue 
of disputed fact. The Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, 
and all reasonable inferences drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving 
party. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences 
from the evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper. Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 
151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a trial court 
is not to weigh evidence or resolve controverted factual issues. American Land Title Company v. 
Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601, 671 P.2d 1063 (1983). 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The elements of a cause of action based upon negligence can be summarized as (1) a 
duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting 
injuries; and actual loss or damage. Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation Dist., 97 Idaho 
580,583,548 P.2d 80,83 (1976). 
No liability exists under the law of torts unless the person from whom relief is sought 
owed a duty to the allegedly injured person. Vickers v. Hanover Constr. Co., Inc., 125 Idaho, 
835, 875 P.2d 929, 932 (1994). One owes the duty to every person in our society to use 
reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be 
reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury. 
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). 
Factors considered in determining whether a duty existed are: 
The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and 
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy 
of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences 
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, 
and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Baccus v. 
AmeriPride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 179 P.3d 309 (2008). 
Western's duty was to timely inspect and clear Wells Fargo's parking lot area of ice. 
Depending upon the weather, the inspection for ice, and clearing, could be required to occur on 
a 24 hour, 7 day per week basis. R. p. 135, ~~ 2 (d) (f) and ~ 4. The inspection for, and clearing 
of, ice is clearly a safety-related undertaking. Western assumed the property owner's duty to 
inspect for, and clear, ice and Gagnon's fall is surely the primary injury that ice melt was 
intended to prevent. Gagnon's slip, fall, and injury were obviously foreseeable. Any burden 
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asserted by Western that would arise as a result of this Court holding it had a duty to Gagnon 
under the circumstances is nonexistent. Commercial contractors are just as capable as property 
owners of protecting themselves by purchasing insurance, or making other protective financial 
arrangements, and spreading the cost among all of their customers. See Gazo v. City of Stamford, 
255 Conn. 245 (2001). The contract provided that Western was required to obtain and maintain 
insurance coverage for its liability to third parties. R. p. 121, ~ 7 C. The contract required: 
C. Commercial General Liability Insurance including coverage for Products, 
Completed Operations and Blanket Contractual Liability, with a minimum 
Combined Bodily Injury and Property Damage Coverage Limit of 
$2,000,000 per occurrence, unless higher coverage is agreed to as specified 
below: R. p. 121, ~ 7 (C). 
Western's obtaining of liability insurance was a bargained for contractual obligation. The 
insurance coverage is primary to, and noncontributory with, any insurance obtained by Wells 
Fargo. As a result of her accident and injuries, Gagnon filed a worker's compensation claim for 
benefits from Wells Fargo. R. p. 121, ~ 7 (E); R. p. 72, p. 50, 1. 21-p. 51, 1. 1-4. Because of 
Western's liability to Gagnon, under Idaho's workers' compensation statutes, Wells Fargo has a 
subrogation right pursuant to which it is entitled to be reimbursed all the worker's compensation 
benefits it pays to Gagnon, including benefits paid to her for temporary total disability (lost 
income), permanent physical impairment (physical injury), and permanent partial or permanent 
total disability (future lost earning capacity). I.C. § 72-223 (3). 
Foreseeability is a flexible and varying concept depending upon the circumstances of 
each case. Where the degree of harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low 
degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely where the degree of harm is minor and the 
burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required. 
Foreseeability is not measured by just what is more probable than not, but also includes whatever 
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result is likely enough in the setting of modem life that a reasonable prudent person would take 
such into account in guiding reasonable conduct. Id.; Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 985 
P.2d 669 (1999). Gagnon's slip, fall, and injuries were obviously foreseeable. 
Ordinarily there is no affirmative duty to act, assist, or protect someone else. Coghlan, 
133 Idaho at 399, 987 P.2d at 311. Such an affirmative duty arises only when a special 
relationship exists between the parties. Whether a special relationship exists is determined by 
evaluating the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a 
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Baccus, 145 Idaho at 350; W. Prosser, Law of Torts 
333 (3d ed. 1964). 
While ordinarily the breach of contract is not a tort, a contract may create the 
circumstances for the commission of a tort. Just's Inc. v. Arrigton Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 
468,583 P.2d 997,1003 (1978). The negligent breach or non-performance ofa contract will not 
sustain an action sounding in tort, in the absence of a liability imposed by law independent of 
that arising out of the contract itself. Steiner Corp. v. American Dist. Telegraph, 106 Idaho 787, 
790,683 P.2d 435, 438 (1984). 
The resolution of this case requires a factual determination by a jury of whether Western 
was contractually obligated to inspect for, and clear, ice on the Wells Fargo's parking lot area 
pavement. In other words, did Western breach its duty to Gagnon by failing to perform its duty 
to inspect for, and clear, ice from the parking lot in a timely manner? 
Since this case requires the factual determination of whether Western had an affirmative 
duty, the issue of whether a special relationship existed between Gagnon and Western arises. 
Baccus, 145 Idaho 346 at 352. This is the first time counsel has been able to locate that this 
Court has had the opportunity to consider this issue in the context of a comprehensive and 
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exclusive property maintenance agreement and also to consider the adoption of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 324A. See Baccus, supra. 
An invitee is a person who enters upon the land for a purpose connected with the business 
conducted there. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 347 (1959). Wells Fargo owed a duty of care to 
Gagnon, an employee coming to work at the bank's office and parking in its designated parking 
lot area. She was an invitee. The law has adopted a protective view toward invitees. An invitee is 
entitled to assume that the property has been made safe for him or her to enter. The property 
owner has not only a duty to disclose dangerous conditions, but also the duty to exercise 
reasonable care to keep the premises safe for an invitee. See Feeny v. Hanson, 84 Idaho 236, 371 
P.2d 15 (1962). 
One who is required by law to use reasonable care for the safety of an invitee coming 
onto its property has a duty to inspect the premises for, and remove, ice and snow for their 
safety. The duty to inspect for and remove ice is a continuing duty. See Kostidis v. General 
Cinema Corp. of Indiana, 754 N.E.2d 563 (2001); Get-N-Go, Inc. v. Markins, 544 N.E.2d 484, 
487 (Ind. 1989.) 
A property maintenance company performing its duties to the property owner under a 
comprehensive and exclusive maintenance contract that requires comprehensive property 
maintenance, inspection, and performance duties, assumes the duty of the property owner to 
invitees. Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 611 N.Y.S.2d 817, 83 N.Y.2d 579 (1994). A 
property maintenance company, performing comprehensive and exclusive obligations, 
contractually assumes the property owner's duty of care to the plaintiff, and stands in the 
property owners shoes, with respect to liability to the plaintiff. Gazo v. City of Stamford, 255 
7 
Conn. 245 (2001). Western, pursuant to its contract with Wells Fargo, purchased insurance to 
protect from third party liability claims. R. p. 121, ~ 7. C. 
Under a comprehensive and exclusive property maintenance contact to maintain a 
property owner's property, a property maintenance company is subject to a third person for 
physical harm resulting from its failure to exercise reasonable care in performing it's obligations 
if (1) it fails to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (2) it has undertaken 
to perform a duty owed by the property owner to the third person, or (3) the harm is suffered 
because of the reliance of the property owner or the third person upon the undertaking. See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A; See Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 
179 P.3d 309 (2008); Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 611 N.Y.S.2d 817,83 N.Y.2d 
579 (1994). Whether a duty was owed is a legal question over which the Court exercises free 
review. Id.; See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is 
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if 
(a) His failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) He has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or 
( c) The harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking. See Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 179 P.3d 309 
(2008). 
Case law, exemplified by a line of cases in the state of New York, sets forth the situations 
in which a contractor is to be found to owe a duty to a third party in tort as detailed in Espinal v. 
Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136 (2002). 
In Espinal, the plaintiff sued Melville Snow Contractors asserting that her fall was due to 
an ICY condition left by it while performing its obligation, under a limited property maintenance 
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contract, to plow snow from her employer's parking lot area. The contract only required Melville 
Snow Contractors to plow snow when accumulations exceeded three (3) inches. Melville had no 
affirmative duty to identify or address icy conditions. The contract duty of Melville was very 
limited. It also specifically required that the identification of icy conditions was the responsibility 
of the property owner, or property manager. When the property owner/property manager 
inspected the property and identified icy conditions, it was the duty of the owner/property 
manager to decide whether the identified icy condition warranted the application of salt and 
sand. It contractually retained these responsibilities. Melville Snow Contractors was only, after 
being told to do so, to spread a mixture of salt and sand on the property. Melville's duty to clear 
ice did not arise until after it was directed to do so at the property owner's directive. 
The court in Espinal undertook a review of the cases pertaining to tort liability based 
upon contractual obligations. It determined that the cases of HR. Mach Co. v. Rensselaer Water 
Co., 247 N.Y. 160 (1928), Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. YB.H Realty Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 220 
(1990), and Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579 (1994) "help light the 
way" in identifying contractual situations where tort liability to third persons was the issue. The 
Espinal court set forth the situations in which a contractor may be liable in tort. The situations 
are: 
1. Where the contracting party fails to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his 
or her duties and thereby launches a force or instrument of harm; 
2. Where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the 
contracting party's duties; and 
3. Where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain 
the premises safely. Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136 
(2002). 
The Espinal court held that, while a contractual obligation will generally not give rise to 
tort liability in favor of a third party properly, these three exceptions to that general rule 
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were firmly rooted in case law. It also stated that these exceptions are consistent with principals 
of tort liability that are generally recognized by other authorities such as the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 324A. Espinal at page 140. 
The district court in granting Western's motion for summary judgment, cited the New 
York case, Anderson v. Jefferson-Utica Group, Inc., supra., as authority. However the court's 
decision only referenced Anderson as standing for the first exception; "where a third party 
contractor creates or exacerbates a dangerous condition." R. p. 220. 
In Anderson the New York court undertook a further analysis of liability in tort of a snow 
plowing contractor. The decision was based upon its consideration of the following cases and 
their cited authorities. 
Torella v. Benderson Development Co., Inc., 307 A.D.2d 727 (2003). 
The property owner entered into a contract with a contractor, Mooney, to provide 
services. It held that Mooney did not launch a force or instrument of harm, and plaintiff did not 
detrimentally rely on did not rely on contractor Mooney. In discussing the third exception, 
comprehensive and exclusive maintenance agreement, the court held that since the property 
owner monitored the performance of the snow plowing contract and retained the right to request 
additional services, that the contract was not a comprehensive and exclusive contract of the 
nature required and cited Espinal as authority. 
Engel v. Eichler, 290 A.D.2d 477 (2002). 
The plaintiff was entering a parked vehicle when another vehicle driven by Eichler hit a 
patch of ice in a parking lot owned by the defendant hospital. Eichler lost control of his vehicle 
and it struck another parked vehicle, and that vehicle in turn struck the vehicle the plaintiff was 
entering. The defendant contractor Vita Construction Company contracted with the hospital to 
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plow snow and to salt and sand its parking lots. The court determined, without describing the 
specificities of Vita's contract with the hospital, that the contract did not constitute a 
comprehensive and exclusive property maintenance obligation. Accordingly it dismissed the 
plaintiff's claim against Vita, but the hospital's claim against Vita based upon inadequate 
performance of its contractual obligations was not dismissed. 
Kozak v. Broadway Joe's, 296 A.D.2d 683 (2002). 
The plaintiff while walking through a parking lot slipped, fell, and hit her head on the 
pavement. The court dismissed the claim against the snow removal contractor because it did not 
have a comprehensive and exclusive property maintenance obligation. It cited Espinal and Palka 
v. Service master Mgt. Servs. Corp. 611 N.Y.S.2d 817,83 N.Y.2 579 (1994), as authority. 
Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 611 N.Y.S. 2d 817, 83 N.Y.2d 579 (1994). 
In Palka, a nurse employed by a hospital was injured when a fan fell from a wall. 
Servicemaster was under contract with the hospital to maintain the hospital premises. The Court 
held that Servicemaster was liable to Palka for personal injuries suffered when Servicemaster 
neglected, or failed, to perform its contractual maintenance obligations with the hospital. 
Sevicemaster's liability for failing to perform its contractual obligations to the hospital were held 
to extend to, and assume, the hospital's duties to invitees. Servicemaster also contracted to 
indemnify and hold the hospital harmless as to any liability arising from its acts or omissions. 
The Court held that persons utilizing the hospital's premises, like Gagnon in this case, had a 
reasonable expectation, and are entitled to rely, that someone is in charge of and responsible for 
basic safety maintenance. Servicemaster's contract placed the total responsibility of safely 
maintaining the premises for invitees on Servicemaster. The Court held that Servicemaster 
undertook a duty, and breached that duty, to maintain the premises safely. Palka's injuries were 
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the result of the negligent performance, or nonperformance, of Servicemaster's duty under its 
comprehensive and exclusive maintenance contract. Because of the comprehensive and exclusive 
nature of Servicemaster's contract to maintain the property owner's property, Servicemaster was 
liable in tort for the injuries suffered by the hospital's Palka as a result of Servicemaster's 
negligent performance, or nonperformance of its contractual duties. 
Borden v. Wilmorite, Inc., 706 N.Y.S.2d 230, 271 A.D.2d 864 (2000). 
Plaintiff slipped on 'black ice' in a parking lot. The court confirmed that a snow removal 
contractor only owes a duty of reasonable care to users of the surface if it has an exclusive 
property management obligation. The snow plow contractor, Santoro, was hired by a property 
management company, Genesee. Under the contract (1) Genesee made the decision as to when 
each plowing would commence and employees of Genesee also engaged in snow removal 
activities, and (2) Genesee had the sole responsibility for sanding the premises as needed. The 
court held that Santoro did not have an exclusive maintenance obligation. It cited Palka as 
authority. 
The Anderson court's decision held that a limited snow plowing duty was not the type of 
"comprehensive and exclusive" property maintenance obligation contemplated in Palka and thus 
the contractor did not assume the property owner's duty to invitees. The court held that because 
the property owner retained the duty to identify icy conditions requiring sand and salt and that it 
was its responsibility to direct Melville to apply salt and sand that it retained its landowner's duty 
to inspect and safely maintain the premises. 
The Western-Wells Fargo property maintenance contract falls squarely within the third 
exception to the general rule; a comprehensive and exclusive maintenance contract. The contract 
obligated Western to maintain Wells Fargo's buildings and parking lots at seventy (70) locations 
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throughout Idaho and at six (6) locations in the Spokane, Washington area. R. p. 138-141. The 
scope of Western's property maintenance contract, which even required Western to purchase and 
maintain liability insurance for claims made by third parties and to fully and completely protect 
Wells Fargo and required coverage for Wells Fargo under any insurance coverage that Western 
obtained, placed Western in the third category above (displacing the property owner's duty to 
maintain premises safely) and within the scope of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, which 
this Court should adopt. Western undertook to fulfill all aspects of Wells Fargo's duty to 
maintain its premises in Idaho and Spokane, Washington, and to purchase and maintain, at its 
own cost, comprehensive liability coverage protecting Wells Fargo from all claims arising out of 
Western's negligent performance, including claims to third parties. 
When a property maintenance contractor undertakes the obligation to perform the duty of 
the property owner to maintain the property owner's property safely for third person invitees, 
under a contract displacing the property owner's duty to invitees through a comprehensive and 
exclusive maintenance obligation, the property management contractor stands in the property 
owner's shoes. The duty owed to third party invitees by the property owner becomes the 
contractor's duty. Whether the property maintenance contractor breached its assumed duty to a 
third party invitee is a question of fact-- did the property maintenance contractor adequately 
perform its contractual obligations and meet its duty to the third party? The existence of a 
question of fact precludes the entry of summary judgment. LR.C.P. 56 (c); Taylor v. AlA 
Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011); American Land Title Company v. Isaak, 
105 Idaho 600, 601, 671 P.2d 1063 (1983). See also Engel v. Eichler, 290 A.D. 477 (New York 
2002). 
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Western is not a small, narrowly focused, business like Mr. Kujawa had in Anderson. 
Western's contractual obligations are akin to those of Jefferson-Utica Group, Inc. The Wells 
Fargo-Western contract reflects the fact that Western is a large and professional full-service 
property maintenance company in the business of taking over, and being responsible for, the 
property owner's maintenance obligations. When it entered into the contract with Wells Fargo, 
Western had been performing property maintenance for property owners for 23 years. R. p. 143, 
~ 17. In addition to the 76 locations that Western agreed to comprehensively maintain for Wells 
Fargo, it also maintained twenty-three (23) other bank's facilities in north Idaho and an 
additional one hundred twenty-one (121) non-bank commercial/industrial sites in southwest, 
south central, and north Idaho. R. p. 143, ~~ 18 and 19. Also, in addition to utilizing 
subcontractors such as Idaho Cleaning Maintenance, Service Master, and Fireball Cleaning, 
Western employed 4 executives, 6 administrators, 9 supervisors, 25 technicians, and 120 
janitors. R. p. 143. 
Wells Fargo is in the business of operating a bank and not the business of property 
maintenance. Western is in the business of property maintenance and not in the business of 
operating a bank. The property maintenance contract required that the "standards of maintenance 
be the highest at all times." R. p. 126, ~ 1. The comprehensive nature of the duty assumed by 
Western is reflected by the fact that the contract is expressly stated to be "a guide for, rather than 
a limitation to, the services required to effectively maintain the Premises." R. p. 126. The 
minimum performance specifications set forth in the contract, which were a guide to, rather than 
a limitation to, extends over eleven pages in the contract. R. p. 126-136. Western was obviously 
placed in the shoes of Wells Fargo regarding the duty to maintain the bank's properties in a safe 
manner. 
14 
Under its contract with Wells Fargo, Western assumed all of Wells Fargo's property 
maintenance responsibilities. It is clear from the comprehensive scope of Western's duties to 
Wells Fargo, that if the bank did not utilize the professional services of Western that it would 
utilize the services of a different property maintenance company to fully and completely 
maintain its property locations throughout Idaho in a safe condition. Western was required to use 
its own employees, agents, and subcontractors, under its "exclusive and complete supervision 
and control," to perform maintenance at all of Wells Fargo's properties. R. p. 121. Western was 
also obligated to maintain insurance coverage, without limitation, for liability claims made by 
third parties arising out of its performance of its contractual obligations. R. p. 121, , 7 (C). 
Western's insurance was primary to and noncontributory with, any insurance obtained by Wells 
Fargo. It is also required that Wells Fargo be a named insured on all policies of insurance, 
including umbrella or excess policies, with respect to all work performed for by Western at 
Wells Fargo properties. R. p. 121 , 7 (E). 
Since the duty to third person invitees on Wells Fargo's property was contractually 
assumed by Western, a question of fact exists as to whether Western adequately performed its 
assumed obligations and met the duty of Wells Fargo to invitees. The existence of a question of 
fact precludes the entry of summary judgment. 
The district court erroneously failed to determine whether Western contracted to, and did, 
assume Wells Fargo's duties to invitees. It interpreted the contract, a question of fact for the 
jury, and that Western's obligation to distribute ice melt only arose when two (2) inches of snow 
had accumulated. R. p. 220. Even a 'minimum' interpretation of the contract's comprehensive 
and exclusive duties of Western do not support such a limitation. 
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The 'Service Agreement' sets forth the obligations of Western to bid certain work out as 
well as separate 'minimum' obligations of Western to perform work. The 'minimum' nature of 
the contract that is a guide to, and not a limitation of, the scope of Western's duty is revealed in 
the obligation of Western to bid out certain work. The 'bid-out' provisions are vague and appear 
inconsistent. R. p. 135. Western was required to bid out to subcontractors. 
2. CONTRACTOR will bid Snow Removal Services to vendors pre-approved by 
BANK using the specifications below: 
c. CONTRACTOR will clear all parking areas and/or sidewalks when two (2) inches 
of snow has accumulated ... 
d. Ice melt is to be used when necessary. In most cases, ice melt will be furnished by 
BANK. If not furnished, ice melt is to be billed as an extra item ... 
e. Areas surrounding the BANK ATM's should be kept reasonably clear of snow and 
ice 7 days per week, 24 hours a day. 
Western was not only required to bid out snow plowing when two (2) inches of snow had 
accumulated but it was also required to bid out, at paragraph (d), the placement of ice melt when 
necessary. The snow plowing requirement is clear, but it was also Western's duty to inspect and 
determine when the timely use of ice melt was necessary. Ice melt was obviously necessary on 
the morning that Gagnon was injured. The emergency crew had to spread sand in order to reach 
the location in the parking lot area where she lay. R. p. 70, at page 19,11. 18-23. As discussed by 
the Indiana court in Kostidis, supra., the duty to inspect for ice on the parking lot area is a 
continuing duty of a property owner and, in this case, it was Western's continuing duty because 
it assumed the bank's duty in this regard and it stands in its shoes. 
Western, through the affidavit ofVaterlaus, asserted that it plowed snow and cleared ice 
at Wells Fargo's property in Hayden, on December 2nd and 3rd, 2007. R. p. 60, " 7 and 8. The 
weather record reports submitted do not support that there was a two (2) inch snow fall on either 
day. They record '0.00' snowfall. R. p. 75. The Vaterlaus affidavit also asserts that Western 
plowed snow and applied ice melt on December 8th• R. p. 60, , 8. The weather record reports 
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'0.00' snowfall on December 8, 2097. R. p. 76. The records do reflect 'precipitation' during that 
time period. R. pp. 75-76. On the morning of Gagnon's accident, December 7th, the weather 
records reflect that the temperature was either 25 degrees or 28 degrees Fahrenheit. R. pp. 76 and 
84. Despite the variance between Western's asserted snow plowing and ice melt application and 
the weather records, it is known that (1) Gagnon slipped on 'black ice', fell, and was seriously 
injured, and (2) the footing at the parking lot where Gagnon fell was so slick and treacherous that 
the emergency personnel coming to assist Gagnon had to put down sand on it before they could 
even reach her location in the parking lot. What is, at least implied, when the assertions of 
Western regarding its snow plowing and application of ice melt activities are compared to the 
weather records, is that Western did not keep and maintain accurate records of its maintenance 
work for Wells Fargo. 
The property owner, Wells Fargo, certainly would not be permitted to claim that it did 
not have a duty to inspect its parking lot for ice or that it could ignore the presence of ice on its 
parking lot. Western, after comprehensively and exclusively assuming Wells Fargo's property 
maintenance duties, stood in Wells Fargo's place and it is also not permitted to claim that it did 
not have a duty not inspect the parking lot for the presence of ice or that it could ignore ice on 
the parking lot. It was Western's duty to maintain the parking lot in a safe manner for the bank's 
invitees. 
Separate and apart from what Western was required to 'bid out', and consistent with the 
continuing duty to inspect for and clear ice, the contract sets forth 'minimum' comprehensive 
maintenance services that Western contracted to provide Wells Fargo. 
3. CONTRACTOR shall employ competent supervisory personnel and assign a 
qualified foreman to supervise all work for the purpose of providing quality control 
overwork. 
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4. CONTRACTOR shall communicate effectively with subcontractors and other 
employees to ensure that all parking lots, sidewalks and other areas designated by 
this contract are cleared of snow and ice in a timely manner ... 
7. The CONTRACTOR shall make available and provide emergency service 24 
hours per day, seven days per week ... " R. p. 135, ~~ 3,4, and 7. 
These performance standards required Western, irrespective of snow fall, to supervise all 
maintenance aspects for quality control and to "ensure" that all parking lots are cleared of ice in 
a timely manner. At a minimum the contract raises a question of fact to be determined by a jury 
whether Western, despite being specifically required to ensure that the parking lots are cleared of 
ice in a timely manner, was only required to ensure that the parking lots are timely cleared of ice 
after two (2) inches of snow accumulated. The district court erred by interpreting the Service 
Agreement contract and finding that Western was only required it to apply ice melt to the 
parking lot areas if there was an accumulation of two (2) inches of snow. 
Invitees on Wells Fargo property are entitled to reasonably expect that someone is in 
charge of and responsible for basic safety and maintenance of the premises. Western contracted 
to assume the duty of Wells Fargo to maintain its property in a manner that is reasonably safe for 
invitees. 
Summary judgment standards require the district court to liberally construe the facts in 
favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of 
the nonmoving party. The plaintiff need not prove that an issue will be decided in its favor at 
trial. Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288 (2006). All doubts 
are to be resolved against the moving party and the motion must be denied "if the evidence is 
such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and if reasonable [people] might reach 
different conclusion." Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., supra., Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 
P.2d (1986); Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67,593 P.2d 402 (1979). 
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The terms of the comprehensive property maintenance contract, a 'minimum' description 
of Western's duty, raises a material question of fact as to whether Western to assumed the duty 
to ensure, regardless of an accumulation of snow, that the bank's parking lot areas were timely 
cleared of ice, for the safety of the bank's invitees. There is certainly no evidence in the record 
that Wells Fargo, at any time undertook any inspection for ice on the parking lot or that it ever 
placed ice melt on the parking lot. This question of fact should have been submitted to the jury 
for determination. The district court erred in interpreting the Service Agreement contract to find 
that Western did not assume Wells Fargo's obligation to ensure that the bank's parking lot areas 
were, at all times, timely cleared of ice and were safe for the bank's invitees. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in not analyzing Western's contractual duty under the New York 
line of cases, exemplified by Palka, or under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A in light of 
the Wells Fargo-Western comprehensive and exclusive' property maintenance agreement under 
which Western assumed full responsibility for the duty of Wells Fargo to maintain its property in 
a reasonably safe condition for its invitees. Wells Fargo contracted with Western to stand in its 
shoes to fulfill its duty to maintaining the property and to protect it from tort liability to third 
parties. Western's contractual duty was to inspect Wells Fargo's parking lot areas for the 
presence of ice and to apply ice melt on the ice when it was located. It is submitted, although it 
ultimately needs to be determined by a jury, that there is no question but that had Western 
inspected the parking lot on the morning of December 7, 2007, it would have located the ice. 
When the emergency personnel arrived shortly after Gagnon was injured the parking lot was too 
treacherous to be walked on, even in an emergency, without first laying down sand for traction. 
Western did not perform its contractual duty to timely clear the parking lot areas of ice. 
19 
Western's duty to clear the parking lot areas of ice was not directed at faceless or an unlimited 
universe of persons. Western's duty was to Wells Fargo's invitees such as Gagnon. It owed a 
duty to Gagnon who parked her car in the parking lot area and slipped on the black ice on her 
way to work. 
The connection between Western's omission to clear the ice and Gagnon's fall and 
injuries was not remote or attenuated. Gagnon's accident was foreseeable and the proximate 
cause of the failure of Western to investigate for, and to clear, the black ice on the parking lot 
area. See Wheeler v. Smith, 96 Idaho 421, 529 .2d 1293 (1974); Palsgrafv. Long Island R.Co., 
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed.,ch. 7, pp. 236-289, § 41-44 
(1971). 
The Gagnons should not be left without a remedy that will fully compensate them for 
Tracy Gagnon's severe and debilitating injuries and Jeffrey Gagnon's loss of consortium caused 
by the tortious negligence of Western. Wells Fargo and Western bargained that Western was 
required to maintain insurance coverage for potential tort liability to third parties. The insurance 
Western was required to maintain was required to be primary to "any insurance" obtained by the 
bank. Wells Fargo should not be left without the ability to be reimbursed for the worker's 
compensation benefits paid to Tracy Gagnon as a result of her accident and injury. Western was 
under a legal duty to prevent foreseeable harm such as occurred to Gagnons once it agreed to 
comprehensively and exclusively maintain Wells Fargo's extensive properties by, among the 
many other duties, inspecting for and clearing ice from the bank's parking lot in a timely manner. 
Western should not be permitted to avoid liability to Gagnon, and it should not be permitted to 
avoid its contractual liability to reimburse Wells Fargo, from the very insurance policies that it 
20 
bargained with Wells Fargo, to provide for coverage in such instances where third parties are 
injured due to its failure to perform its contractual duties. 
The judgment should be reversed and remanded to the trial court for trial. 
~ 
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